One very powerful articulation of the link between queer, time and the non-
Studies in the Maternal, 6(1), 2014, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk capitalism through alternative temporal practices (Povinelli 2011) . Taken as a 'temporal turn' in cultural studies, this body of work draws attention to the ways that time 'binds' us (Freeman 2011) into specifically patterned lives, intimately linked to national narratives, capitalist economic logics, and timelines of birth, development, marriage, reproduction, the accumulation and passing on of wealth, and death.
Edelman argues that current communal relations in the West are organised through the absolute primacy of heteronormativity, so much so that the future can only be thought of in relation to the developmental sequence of such a normative timeline. Therefore, queer resistance to such an order can only show up as resistance in opposition to the Child. Rather than acceding to this dualism by protesting against this othered position in order to gain access to the social domain, Edelman proposes a deliberate identification with the figure who is indeed 'not fighting for the children'. In this way, queerness remains a radical form of nonidentity which attains its ethical value through an acceptance of its status as the 'outside' and 'beyond' of the social order's political symptoms which he names as the death drive. Queer is a refusal of any form of consolidated identity which is always linked to history as linear narrative, in which meaning reveals itself as itself, through time (Edelman 2004, p. 4) . Over and over, Edelman says 'no' through a paradoxical acceptance and embracing of the negativity assigned to queer, and over and over, the 'no', which takes the form of an embrace, of a yes, is directed at the temporal category of the future understood in linear developmental terms. The temporality of this refusal is not just that of repetition in the sense of the return of the repressed, but that of the constant. There can be no let up of the no. It is the ongoing, unrelenting negativity that also echoes the law of the Symbolic's 'foundational act, its selfconstituting negation' (Edelman 2004, p. 5) . Whilst signification, which operates through the deferral of meaning, requires a projection forwards, a relationship we could say with the future, at the same time the death drive, which is also a function of the Symbolic, provides a constant negative force against even the possibilities of deferral. Queer can expose that constancy, the inescapability of access to jouissance in the social order itself.
Two issues arise from Edelman's conjoining of no with future that pertain to maternal time. The first is that we may be seeing a radical shift in the ways we imagine futures, so much so that the fantasy of an unfolding future held in place by heteronormative familial trajectories may no longer function as a dominant cultural narrative. Franco 'Bifo ' Berardi, for instance, is one of many voices noting that we are now living in the 'end times' of late capitalism, which radically changes the ways in which we relate to narratives of progress and Studies in the Maternal, 6(1), 2014, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk future (Berardi 2011a ). For Berardi, our times are characterized by 'the cultural collapse of the most important mythology of capitalist modernity: that of "the future" and its associated myths of energy, expansion, and growth', (Berardi 2011b, non-paginated ended. In other words, we may no longer require the figure of the Child to suture an imaginary that has already collapsed.
The second issue has to do with feminism, the death drive and its relation to the temporality of repetition. Edelman's Lacanian death drive is a constant pressure created by an excess of access to jouissance, and has the temporal structure of eternal return with no movement, and no difference. Slavoj Zizek, writing in the same vein, describes the death drive in terms of the undead: 'this terrifying insistence beneath death, which is why Freud links death drive to the compulsion to repeat. You know, it can be dead, but it goes on' (Zizek 2006, p. 61) . Here there is too much time, an endless and ongoing agonizing, yet pleasurable repetition, that paradoxically brings on more of the same. Yet if we return to
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, for Freud this repetition is also a deviation. The life of an organism is figured as an ongoing deviation that seeks to maintain its existence by resisting any path to death that does not conform to its own particular limits and conditions for self-preservation.
As Freud puts it, these conditions 'are component instincts whose function it is to assure that the organism shall follow its own path to death, and to ward off any possible ways of returning to inorganic existence other than those which are immanent in the organism itself … what we are left with is the fact that the organism wishes to die only in its own fashion' (Freud 1922, p. 33 ). Though we repetitively return, we return to a particular place, utterly singular, in order to die in our own way. It is this tension, however, between the constant repetition of the death drive, and the truly repetitious, which incorporates the utterly singular, that we can see threaded through early feminist literature that sought to understand the place Repetition is linked with the radicality of care on which such autonomy is dependent.
In the light of this, I want to close with a reflection on the poet and historian, Denise I'll not be writing about death, but about an altered condition of life. The experience that not only preoccupied but occupied me was of living in suddenly arrested time: that acute sensation of being cut off from any temporal flow that can grip you after the sudden death of your child. And a child, it seems, of any age. (Riley 2012, p. 6) The temporal disordering that the death of an adult child prompts affects the capacity to narrativise, due to a changed relationship with the future that the unfolding of narrative in time requires. Riley is concerned with what it means for time to stop and time to flow, and for another kind of stopped time, the lively and prolonged time of the dead, to occupy lived time. Riley is clear that 'time stopped' is an inadequate metaphor for the prolonged time that is arrested after the death of an adult child. Although we can technically say that the time of the dead is timeless in that the dead cannot return and hence time as movement or change is somehow foreclosed by the ongoing deadness of the dead, one's engagement with a dead
Studies in the Maternal, 6(1), 2014, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk child, she maintains, is in fact lively. It is not the dead time, for instance, of depression; one continues to be involved on a day-to-day basis in an energetic way with the dead child.
Instead, it is one's relation to everyday life that goes through a dramatic shift, one in which time can no longer unfold predictably or reliably as a crisis has occurred in the reliability that the future will unfold. In one sense, time is 'crystalline', as she puts it, in which nothing flows because nothing can be expected, whilst at another it continues as a form of daily engagement with 'timelessness'. Time doesn't stop, but it doesn't develop either. It is simply suspended. Riley therefore poses the question of the philosophy of endurance, asking what it means to endure when there is no longer any temporality left in which to wait it out?
Time here is not 'distorted':
What's changed is more radical than that. Simply, you are no longer in time. Only from your freshly removed perspective can you fully understand how our habitual intuitions of time can falter. (Riley 2012, p. 196) You cannot register the underlying sense that time moves until its movement has collapsed.
What is revealed then is a way of being outside of time's motion without being outside of
time. Perhaps what's specific is this: that with the death of your child, your own time may be especially prone to disturbance, because the lost life had, so to speak, previously unfurled itself inside your own life. (Riley 2012, p. 255) I read Riley's comments here as metaphorical of any life that could be said to unfurl itself inside your own life. It might be that any relation that we name as a relation with a child has this quality, someone that is of any age, and of any relation to another, but who has somehow, in some way unfurled itself inside your own life. Whilst narrative, the time of opens this crystalline time, time that is lived but does not flow. This is not the constant excessive time of the death drive as it deviates from life, and it's not the unfolding of a linear future, but something else that one may want to hold onto as a way to articulate the temporality of (non)-reproduction.
